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CASE NOTE
MINERAL CONVEYANCES-Determination of the Estate the Grantor Purports
to Convey-Sheltering the Royalty Interest Under the Umbrella of
the Warranty-The Non-Applicability of the Doctrine of Record
Notice. Selman v. Bristow, 402 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).

This 'decision determines who as between the grantor and
grantee must bear the burden of an outstanding one-eighth
"of the royalty"' interest which was undisclosed by the
warranty deed between the parties. This outstanding interest
was created by a reservation in the deed from Mrs. Weeden
to Bristow and Austin, the grantors in the principal case.2
Bristow and Austin then conveyed to Selman. In this conveyance, the grantors reserved an undivided one-fourth interest to themselves and purported to grant an undivided
three-fourths interest to Selman.' Selman chose not to make
any title search and the deed failed to mention the royalty
commitment' held by the defendants' grantor, although, there
was reference to the Weeden deed as the source of title.5 The
grantors initiated this action to determine their share of the
burden imposed by the Weeden reservation. The trial court
ruled in favor of the grantors and applied the formula which
they advanced; namely, that the outstanding interest be
apportioned between the holders of the mineral interests according to the portion of the mineral interest held-this
would mean that the grantors would bear one-fourth of the
burden and the grantee would bear three-fourths. On review,
the Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court on the
basis of their construction of the effect of the warranty deed,
their construction of the intent of the parties from the face
of the instrument,6 and an application of the Duhig rule." A
Selman v. Bristow, 402 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), writ of
error denied, 406 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. 1966).
2. Id. at 521.
3. Id. at 523.
4. 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW § 303.1, at 448 (1964) (hereinafter
1.

cited

as WILLIAMS & MEYERS).

5. Selman v. Bristow, supra note 1, at 523.
6. Id. at 523.
7. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co. v. Duhig, 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (1940).
In a dispute where the grantor-by warranty deed-purported to convey
a one-half mineral interest and reserve a one-half mineral interest when,
in fact, the grantor received only one-half of the mineral estate in his grant,
the court held that the grantor was estopped from asserting his reservation
against the grant by virtue of the warranty. Thus, the rule is that where
there has been a conveyance by warranty deed of more than the grantor
actually holds at the time of the conveyance, the grantor will bear the burden
of the loss because of his warranty to the grantee.
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request for a writ of error was denied by the Supreme Court
of Texas.'
Since this case involves the operation of certain definitions, it is necessary to give cursory attention to the definition
of certain terms. A warranty deed is a contract between the
paries which has the same effect as a similar contract between
the parties to a sale of goods. It is a pledge by the seller
(grantor) that the quality and quantity of the goods (property) which are the subject of the sales contract (deed of
conveyance) are the same as described by that sales contract.'
A mineral interest is a present realty interest which carries
certain appurtenances; among these is the right to the development of the minerals in place'" and a right to share in the
use of the fruits of the production of these minerals (the royalty)." A royalty interest is a present realty interest"2 which,
in the absence of any additions by specific terms of the
conveyance, is the right to have the use of a share of the
production." It is to be observed that these standard definitions make a royalty interest a part (an appurtenance) of the
mineral interest, conveyed as part of that interest unless it
has been specifically "carved out" from the mineral interest.
In theory, this would mean that a warranty deed which
passed a mineral interest would, absent any language indicating some other state of title, also be a warrant that the particular appurtenances to that mineral interest were included
and that no part of the inherent rights to the use of a share
of the production have been severed.
However, the finding by the trial court that the burden
of the outstanding royalty should be apportioned between
the mineral interests is a finding that the definitions outlined
above do not apply to the facts of the principal case. This
8. Bristow v. Selman, 406 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. 1966).
9. 77 C.J.S. Sales §§ 301, 302(d) (1952).
10. Stephans County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290,
29 A.L.R. 566 (1923). This case held that the question of an interest in the
minerals in place as a realty interest was a closed question in Texas; the
question having been answered in the affirmative. Id. at 292.
11. WILLIAMS & MEYERS § 202.2, at 24 and § 301, especially the summary at
442 and 443.
12. Sheffield v. Hogg, 124 Tex. 290, 77 S.W.2d 1021 (1934). This case held
that a royalty interest is a realty interest and, hence, is subject to certain
types of taxation which affect realty interests and do not affect personalty
interests.
13. WxLaI&AMs & MEYERs § 801, at 436.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol3/iss1/6

2

Gordnier: Mineral Conveyances - Determination of the Estate the Grantor Pur

1968

CASE NoTE

follows, in that, if the warranty is not to be extended to the
royalty interest-if the royalty interest is considered to be a
separate estate from the mineral interest-the grantee must
look beyond the warranty from his grantor to ascertain the
quantum of the estate which he takes." If the grantee must
look beyond his grantor's warranty, then he must depend
upon the record and the doctrine of record notice applies
by virtue of the reference to the Weeden deed.1 5 This record
appraises the grantee of the fact that there is an outstanding
interest in the royalty and he takes his grant subject to the
burden of this interest."6 This analysis would lead to the
result handed down by the trial court.
The Court of Civil Appeals begins its analysis by stating
that: "Both the interest in the minerals in place and the
interest in the royalty based on production of these minerals
are separate and distinct estates in land."' This statement
is not accurate in that, strictly speaking, there can be at
most only two estates in any given land-the surface estate
and the mineral estate.' Each of these estates may be divided
into various interests which are less than the full estate and,
it would seem, this is what the court is trying to suggest.
However, the use of the term estate appears to cause the court
to attempt to conduct its analysis of the principal case in
terms of three distinct and separate estates, none of which are
appurtenances of the others, each of which may be separately
conveyed. This treatment would further mean that a warranty with respect to any one of these estates alone would
not be a warranty with respect to the others. The effect of
this thinking is reflected in the opinion of the court when it
seeks to 'describe the interest held by the grantors at the
time of their conveyance to Selman; the court states: "Prior
to their conveyance to Selman, Bristow and Austin owned
14. W. T. Carter & Bros. v. Davis, 88 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). This
case held that in cases involving mineral conveyances by a quitclaim deed,
the record will determine what the parties took at the time(s) of their
conveyance(s). The inference here is that in the absence of any expression
of intention as between the grantor and the grantee as to what is to be
passed by the conveyance, the record will rule. The opposing proposition
would be that where the intent as between the parties is clear without any
reference-warranted-the quantum passed will be determined by the face
of the instrument between the parties.
15. Id. See also Loomis v. Cobb, 159 S.W. 305 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
16. Id.
17. Selman v. Bristow, supra note 1, at 524.

18. WMLTAMS & MEYERS § 801, at 431 n.1.
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100% of the minerals in place."1 9 If this is an accurate
description of the quantum held by the grantors, then it seems
clear that their warranty is sound because they did hold all
that they purported to dispose of in their conveyance. Further, it would mean that the mineral estate did not include
any severed royalty interest as an appurtenance. Therefore,
the grantee should be held to the duty to look beyond the
warranty of his grantor to the record to determine the existence of any severed royalty interests and the result in the
trial court would appear to be the result which should rule
at the appellate level.
The court qualifies-actually contradicts-the statement
noted above in the immediately succeeding sentence in which
it states: "They (the grantors) could not, however, because
of the outstanding royalty interest, convey to Selman the full
fee simple title to three-fourths of the minerals and yet at
the same time reserve one-fourth of the minerals for themselves."" This is recognition of the generally accepted nature
of the royalty interest as a necessary appurtenance of the full
mineral interest. The effect of this recognition is the inducement of a situation which is subject to the provisions of the
Duhig rule and which will charge the full burden of the
outstanding interest to the grantor on his liability under the
warranty. The general rule to be derived from the decision,
then, is that the warranty umbrella extends to the royalty
interest and will operate to shelter the grantee against an
assertion of the grantors' reservation against his grant.
In reaching the holding discussed above, the court also
decides that the doctrine of record notice does not apply in
cases of this type when the grantee fails to make a title
search. This in effect means that the reference to the prior
deed can not operate to limit the granting clause. This is
because the warranty states what is to be granted and guaran19. Selman v. Bristow, supra note 1, at 524. Note also the statement which
says that: "[I]n effect, such a reservation [reference to the royalty reser"
vation] would be equivalent to a reservation . . . of the mineral estate ....
If this statement is limited only to the interest in the use of the production,
it is correct, but if equivalent is given its usual meaning, it is not correct.
The royalty interest doesn't carry any of the appurtenances of the mineral
interest and the use of the word equivalent seems to be further evidence
of confusion resulting from the definition of these interests as "separate
and distinct estates in land."
20. Id.
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tees the quantum of that grant,2 ' while the record notice doctrine operates to answer the question of what is conveyed in
cases where there has been no express statement of what is
to be conveyed.2 2 This is in line with the law of the jurisdiction and with the general law as respects the operation of
record notice with respect to a warranty deed in the area of
mineral conveyances.2 3 It raises the question of whether such
holdings are compatible with an established public policy
which gives great weight to the record of title in conveyancing.24 The implication with respect to the record notice doctrine arising from this case is that the grantee may ignore
the record and choose to rely solely on the warranty of his
grantor, and the grantor bears the entire risk of his failure
to fully define the nature of the interest which is to be conveyed.
JOHN A. GORDNIER

21. Supra note 9.
22. W. T. Carter & Bros. v. Davis, supra note 14.
23. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co. v. Duhig, supra note 7, at 879. See also, Body v.
McDonald, 334 P.2d 513 (Wyo. 1959) which held that actual notice is not
sufficient to allow a limitation to be placed on the grant where there has
been a conveyance by a warranty deed. If the court in the principal case
had found that the grantee did know of the reservation in the chain of title,
it is doubtful that the result would have been different.
24. Loomis v. Cobb, supra note 15. See also the discussion of public policy
behind the doctrine of record notice in Sheffield v. Hogg, supra note 12.
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